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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have played a key role
in a wide range of machine learning applications. However, DNN
classifiers are vulnerable to human-imperceptible adversarial
perturbations, which can cause them to misclassify inputs with
high confidence. Thus, creating robust DNNs which can defend
against malicious examples is critical in applications where
security plays a major role. In this paper, we study the effect
of intrinsic dataset properties on the performance of adversarial
attack and defense methods, testing on five popular image classi-
fication datasets MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR10/CIFAR100,
and ImageNet. We find that input size and image contrast play
key roles in attack and defense success. Our discoveries highlight
that dataset design and data preprocessing steps are important to
boost the adversarial robustness of DNNs. To our best knowledge,
this is the first comprehensive work that studies the effect of
intrinsic dataset properties on adversarial machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has seen tremendous success recently in
many applications including image and voice recognition,
text generation and classification, and autonomous driving.
However, researchers have shown that deep neural networks
(DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarially perturbed inputs [1].
Thus, much work has been done developing strategies to
create models robust to such adversarial inputs. Most current
literature in the field of adversarial machine learning focuses
primarily on image recognition tasks. There are also recent
works on the applicability of adversarial attacks on other tasks
such as speech [2] [3], text [4], and reinforcement learning [5].
As machine learning and DNNs become more prevalent
across a wide variety of application fields, including sensi-
tive applications that require security and privacy, creating
robust DNNs that perform accurately in spite of adversarially
perturbed inputs becomes a critical task for deploying such
networks.
Although much work has been previously done exploring
new adversarial attacks for benchmarking adversarial robust-
ness and new defense methods to secure networks [6] [7], no
work to our best knowledge has explored the effect of dataset
properties on adversarial attack and defense performance.
Given that proper dataset design and preprocessing plays a
crucial role in ensuring the accuracy of DNNs, we believe
that such dataset properties may also affect the performance
of adversarial attack and defense methods. We suggest intrinsic
dataset properties, such as image size and image contrast, may
impact adversarial robustness and experimentally demonstrate
the effect of these properties against a variety of attack and
defense methods on five popular image classification datasets.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We first suggest and discuss two intrinsic dataset prop-
erties, image size and image contrast, which may affect
adversarial robustness.
• We explore the effects of these dataset properties on
adversarial robustness, showing that they affect attack and
defense performance across several popular datasets and
under different attack and defense methods.
• We give explanations for why these dataset properties
may affect adversarial robustness.
• We discuss possible applications of leveraging these
properties for future robust dataset design, preprocessing
steps, and adversarial machine learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides preliminaries of neural networks and adversarial
machine learning, and then explains the adversarial attacks
and defenses we will use in our study. Section III explains
the intrinsic dataset properties such as image size and image
contrast that we believe will play important roles in adversarial
machine learning. Section IV shows extensive experimental
results on intrinsic dataset properties on adversarial robustness,
using various attack and defense techniques on five popular
datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and
ImageNet. Section V concludes the paper with future research
directions and potential applications.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first provide some background infor-
mation about deep learning and neural networks, particularly
convolutional neural networks. Then, we will provide a brief
summary of adversarial machine learning, and different attack
and defense techniques.
A. Deep Learning and Neural Networks
The widespread use of deep learning techniques and neural
networks began with AlexNet [8], a convolution neural net-
work that achieved state-of-the-art results on several image
classification benchmarks in 2012. Neural networks allow
machine learning models to learn features from raw input
data. The intermediate layers, known as hidden layers, of a
neural network help it extract underlying patterns within the
raw, unstructured data, allowing for better model performance.
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Thus, DNN architectures have found incredible success in
learning from complex, multidimensional inputs.
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in particular have
found widespread use in image recognition tasks. A CNN
is mainly comprised of convolutional layers, which attempt
to extract useful features from two-dimensional input data
to create a feature map. Then, the model uses pooling and
downsampling layers to reduce the dimensionality of interme-
diate feature maps, retaining only the most important features.
Finally, a fully-connected layer predicts a final result from
the previously-computed feature map. CNNs thus can take
advantage of the intrinsic structure of two-dimensional data,
leading to their excellent performance and popularity on image
recognition tasks.
B. Adversarial Machine Learning
The goal of adversarial machine learning is to study
methods of exploiting machine learning pipelines to identify
weaknesses and build more robust machine learning models.
Thus, it is imperative to first understand the different types of
adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks against neural networks
fall into several categories [9] [6]:
Evasion. Evasion attacks aim to evade a machine learning
system by passing it carefully crafted inputs at inference
time. If successful, an evasion attack would craft malicious
inputs that cause the machine learning system to fail to
produce correct outputs. Evasion attacks are the most common
adversarial attack and thus the most-studied type of adversarial
attack.
Poisoning. Poisoning attacks occur during the training
phase of a machine learning system. In a poisoning attack, an
attacker attempts to insert malicious inputs into the training
data of a model with the goal of compromising the model’s
training.
Extraction. Extraction attacks attempt to extract the details
of a model, its training procedure, and training data. With the
application of machine learning in sensitive fields, extraction
attacks could allow malicious agents to access proprietary
models and sensitive data such as medical records.
In this paper, we primarily focus on evasion attacks as they
comprise the majority of adversarial attacks. Evasion attacks
fall into several categories based on the adversary’s access to
the targeted model and training data:
White-Box Attack. In a white-box attack, we assume that
the adversary has full access to the model parameters, training
algorithm, and training data distribution. We focus specifically
on the white-box threat model in this paper.
Gray-Box Attack. In a gray-box attack, we assume that the
adversary knows about the target model and the defense, but
not the parameters of the defense. The adversary only knows
the underlying learning algorithm and model topology but has
no access to the training data or the trained parameters.
Black-Box Attack. Under a black-box threat model, the ad-
versary only has query access to the targeted model, meaning
they can only access the prediction and confidence score for
a given input.
As most popular attack methods in the literature are
gradient-based and thus fall under the white-box threat model,
we operate under the white-box threat model for all of our
experiments, giving the attacker full access to the model and
gradients. By using attack methods that work in the white-box
threat model, we hope to make it easier to compare our results
to the existing literature.
C. Adversarial Attacks.
We now provide a brief overview of each attack method
used in our experiments.
1) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): Goodfellow et al.
[10] introduced the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which
quickly takes the gradient of the cost function with respect to
a given input. For a maximum allowable perturbation , a cost
function J , and a model with parameters θ, input x, and label
y, FGSM linearizes the cost function at the current θ and
returns a perturbation ρ as a step of size  in the direction that
maximizes the cost function:
ρ =  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y))
As a simple gradient calculation that can be computed
quickly through backpropagation, FGSM provides a cost-
effective method to adversarially perturb an input to a neural
network.
2) Basic Iterative Method (BIM): An extension of FGSM,
the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [11] applies FGSM multiple
times with a small step size, clipping pixel values after each
step to ensure that the perturbed image remains within the -
neighborhood of the original image. Formally, the perturbed
image is defined as:
xadv0 = x, x
adv
N+1 = Clipx,{xadvN + α · sign(∇xJ(θ, xadvN , y)}.
where α is the step size for each iteration of BIM.
3) Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) is a first-order attack method introduced by
Madry et al. [12]. PGD is a multi-step, iterative gradient-
based attack that attempts to maximize the cost function via
the following equation:
xt+1 = Πx+S(x
t +  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y))
where Π is the projection onto the ball of the maximum
allowable perturbation x+ S. Essentially, one can view PGD
as a multi-step variant of FGSM. The additional attack ef-
fectiveness from multiple iterations makes PGD a powerful
first-order adversary.
4) DeepFool: DeepFool [13] attempts to calculate adver-
sarial perturbations by perturbing a given input x0 along
the orthogonal projection of x0 to its separating decision
boundary. At each iteration, DeepFool linearizes the model
function f at the current point xi and then computes the
minimal perturbation ri as:
argmax
ri
||ri||2 subject to f(xi) +∇f(xi)T ri = 0.
D. Adversarial Defense Strategies
Current adversarial defense strategies fall into three main
categories compression-based defenses, adversarial retraining,
and modeling-based defenses. Compression-based defenses
aim to reduce the impact of adversarial perturbations by
attempting to smooth such perturbations, thus reducing their
effectiveness. Dziugaite et al. [14] explored the use of JPEG
compression to smooth input images before model inference,
discovering that JPEG compression is effective in some cases
in reducing the drop in classification accuracy for small
perturbation sizes. Additionally, Guo et al. [15] attempted
using total variance minimization (TVM) [16] and other image
transformations to counter adversarial perturbations, discover-
ing that total variance minimization can significantly improve
the robustness of DNNs to adversarial attack.
Adversarial retraining attempts to retrain the original model
on adversarially-generated inputs to improve its robustness.
However, retraining often fails to generalize across different
attack methods, or even the same attack method run with
different parameters. Several works have proposed different
training schemes aimed at improving the generalizability of
adversarial retraining. Madry et al. [12] suggested retrain-
ing using adversarial examples generated using PGD, as
retraining on more powerful adversarial examples often leads
to model robustness against weaker examples. Tramr et al.
[17] proposed ensemble adversarial training, which augments
a model’s training data with perturbations transferred from
other models. Finally, modeling-based approaches try to use a
separate network architecture to detect adversarial examples,
either discarding them or attempting to remove adversarial per-
turbations. Song et al. [18] proposed PixelDefend, a modeling-
based defense that uses the log likelihoods of a PixelCNN
[19] model to detect adversarial examples, as such images lie
outside of the probability distribution of the clean training data.
They then purify adversarial examples using the PixelCNN,
modifying the perturbed image so that it can be classified
correctly.
As the latter two categories of defense techniques are not
model and attack agnostic, and our goal is to study the effect of
intrinsic dataset properties across several attacks and datasets,
we mainly focus on two compression defenses (TVM and
JPEG) in this work. Being model and attack agnostic, such
compression-based defenses provide a baseline to measure the
relationship between intrinsic dataset properties and defense
performances.
III. INTRINSIC DATASET PROPERTIES
In this section, we will discuss some intrinsic properties
of datasets, formulate metrics to quantify them, and hypoth-
esize how such properties might affect adversarial attack and
defense performance.
A. Image Size
We first consider the size of input images as an intrinsic
dataset property. Fig. 1 shows an image taken from the
ImageNet dataset resized to three different crops. The top
left image is cropped to 56 × 56, the bottom left image
is cropped to 112 × 112, and the right image is cropped
to 224 × 224 which is the standard crop used for many
ImageNet classification networks. Current neural networks
work best with fixed image sizes, as a trained network’s
weights will only perform optimally for features of a certain
predetermined scale. Although to the best of our knowledge
no comprehensive study has been done on the effect of input
image size on neural network performance, intuitively a larger
input size should result in higher classification accuracy, as a
larger input image means more input features that a network
could use for prediction. However, larger input images usually
come at a higher computational cost since models are usually
deeper to represent functions that fit this higher dimensional
input. Additionally, simply storing and loading larger input
images increases memory usage, thus making training with
very high quality images infeasible for many applications,
particularly for edge applications with limited resources. We
discover, however, that larger input images may be easier to
adversarially attack. Thus, such larger images may not be
optimal for adversarial robustness, as we shall see in IV.
Fig. 1. Three different resized versions (56×56, 112×112, and 224×224)
of an image taken from ImageNet.
B. Image Contrast
Image contrast is the difference in luminance and color
values between different pixels within a given image. Fig. 2
shows an image taken from the ImageNet dataset at three
different contrast settings. The original image is in the center,
the image at half the original contrast value is on the left and
the image at twice the original contrast value is on the right.
Although there are many definitions of image contrast, such
definitions generally follow the form:
∆luminance
avg. luminance
High contrast images have their pixel values spread out over a
greater range of values, while low contrast images have a nar-
row range of pixel values. As a result, details in high contrast
images are more visible than those in low contrast images.
Intuitively, this “sharpening” effect on details within an image
should lead to higher classification accuracy as image details
are more visible, a classifier can more easily identify and use
such features for its prediction. However, Dodge et al. [20]
Fig. 2. An ImageNet image at three different contrast settings.
discovered that image contrast appears to have little effect on
classifier performance. When they reduced the image contrast
of input images by blending the original images with gray
images, performance degrades only if contrast is significantly
reduced. As previous work has not found that image contrast
affects network classification substantially, image contrast is
not widely considered as an important data augmentation step.
However, as we later demonstrate in our experiments, we
discover that image contrast indeed plays an important role
in adversarial attack and compression defense performance.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we study the effects of input size and
image contrast on adversarial machine learning using five
popular image classification datasets: MNIST [21], Fashion-
MNIST [22], CIFAR10 [23], CIFAR100 [23], and ImageNet
[24]. The MNIST [21] dataset consists of 70,000 32 × 32
grayscale images split into 10 classes for handwritten digit
recognition. The Fashion-MNIST dataset consists of 70,000
32 × 32 grayscale images split into 10 different classes of
fashion items. As Fashion-MNIST images are of fashion items
rather than handwritten digits, they appear more visually
complex than MNIST images. The CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
[23] consists of 60,000 32 × 32 color images split into 10
and 100 classes respectively. Finally, the ImageNet image
classification dataset [24] consists of 1.2 million images of
drawn from 1000 classes.
On each benchmark we evaluate four different white box
attacks: FGSM [10], BIM [11], PGD [12], and DeepFool [13].
We use the L∞ norm and  ∈ { 2255 , 4255 , 8255 , 16255} for all
attacks. On each benchmark, we also evaluate three defense
settings: no defense, TVM compression defense [15], and
JPEG compression defense [14]. We use four NVIDIA Tesla
V100 GPUs for all of our experiments.
A. Input Size Experiments
To study the effect of image input size on the performance
of adversarial attack and defense methods, we use three
different input image sizes for each of our datasets and rescale
the original images to the given input size using a bilinear
interpolation. For MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR10, and
CIFAR100, we evaluate on three separate image sizes: half
of the original input size, the original input size, and double
the original input size. As ImageNet images are significantly
larger than images from the other datasets, we evaluate on
ImageNet images scaled to a fourth of the original size, half
the original size, and the original images.
On all datasets, we apply random resized crops and ran-
dom horizontal flipping as data augmentation steps to boost
classifier accuracy during training. Additionally, we also apply
random rotations of up to 15 degrees to CIFAR100 images as
an additional augmentation step to boost the network accuracy
to state of the art.
1) Experiments on MNIST/Fashion-MNIST:
Settings: As we use images scaled to both half and double
the original input size for our experiments, we additionally
evaluate on 14×14 and 56×56 images. For both datasets, we
adapt the convolutional neural network described by Madry
et. al [12], consisting of two convolutional layers with 32 and
64 filters respectively, each followed by a pooling layer, and
a fully connected layer of size 1024. Instead of using 2 × 2
max-pooling after the second convolutional layer, we instead
use an adaptive max-pooling layer to support dynamic input
shapes for our experiments. For training, we use the Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01 and betas of 0.9 and
0.999. We run our model for 100 epochs using a batch size
of 64, using PyTorch’s learning rate scheduler to reduce the
learning rate if no improvement is seen in the loss after five
consecutive epochs.
Results: The results of the adversarial attacks and defense
methods are shown in Fig. 3 for MNIST and in Fig. 4
for Fashion-MNIST. Our original MNIST model achieves a
top-1 accuracy of 98.39%, while our Fashion-MNIST model
achieves a top-1 accuracy of 91.20%. We discover that given
attacks and defenses perform differently as a result of the input
image size. On both datasets and across all attacks, input
size correlates negatively with adversarial robustness when
no defense is applied 14 × 14 images consistently perform
better against attacks with only one outlier. We believe this
may result from overfitting as both MNIST and F-MNIST
are fairly simple datasets, potentially resulting in the CNN
overfitting and becoming vulnerable to adversarial exploita-
tion. By training on smaller input images with less features,
we force the CNN to learn a better underlying representation
of the data, making it more robust to adversarial examples.
Another explanation may be that smaller input images limit
an attacker’s choice of possible perturbations simply because
smaller images contain fewer pixels to modify.
However, when TVM and JPEG defenses are applied to
Fig. 3. Input size results on MNIST. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given attack
(FGSM, BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
these attacks, larger images tend to lead to better adversarial
robustness. In fact, for  ∈ { 2255 , 4255 , 8255} across all attacks,
the TVM defense does more damage than the original attack
for 14 × 14 images. Compression defenses like TVM and
JPEG may disproportionately impact smaller input images
by destroying useful features vital for classification, leading
to worse defense performance compared to larger images,
where compression will leave behind more features while still
smoothing adversarial perturbations. For small  values, the
boost in defense performance from using larger input images
outweighs the boost in attack performance from larger images,
as the attack method is limited by the small value of .
For large values of , however, the increased ease of attack
may outweigh the benefits that a large input size offers to
compression defense approaches: the massive drop in the
accuracy of 56× 56 images in Fig. 3 (TVM-BIM and TVM-
PGD combinations) and Fig. 4 (all TVM and JPEG defenses
except on DeepFool) shows that the larger input size gives
the attack more possible perturbations, allowing it to find a
better adversarial example. Intuitively, adversarial attack is
easier than defense as an attack only needs to perturb clean
images, while a defense must successfully defend against
adversarial examples while still allowing the model to classify
clean examples correctly. Thus in these cases, 14×14 images
perform much better than 56× 56 images for  = 16255 . This is
very interesting, as smaller images can be more robust under
adversarial attacks in both situations, without any defense and
with compression defense.
We note that this trend does not hold true for DeepFool.
As shown in the last column of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, the defense
performance across input sizes is roughly the same regardless
of  value. Even for the largest  value of 16255 , both the TVM
and JPEG defenses return the classifier accuracy to more than
97% for 56× 56, close to the original classification accuracy.
This indicates that both TVM and JPEG are performing
significantly better against the DeepFool attack than against
other attacks. Additionally, given that both defenses appear
to reach virtually the same defended accuracy regardless of
 value, we believe that both defenses are performing very
well for the DeepFool attack, suggesting that compression-
based defenses successfully remove adversarial perturbations
generated by DeepFool. We hypothesize the higher accuracy
of defense methods on DeepFool compared to our other attack
methods lies in the difference between DeepFool and our
other attack methods. Instead of perturbing in the direction
that maximizes the cost function, DeepFool perturbs in the
direction orthogonal to the linearized decision boundary of
the attacked model.
2) Experiments on CIFAR10/CIFAR100:
Settings: For our experiment, we use input images sizes
∈ {16× 16, 32× 32, 64× 64}. For both datasets, we use the
ResNet-18 architecture layout specified for CIFAR by He et
al. [25] with one modification, changing the average pooling
layer before the fully connected layer to an adaptive average
pooling layer to support dynamic input sizes.
For training CIFAR10, we use SGD with momentum, setting
Fig. 4. Input size results on Fashion-MNIST. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given
attack (FGSM, BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
an initial learning rate of 0.1, weight decay of 5e−4, and
momentum of 0.9. We run our model for 350 epochs using
a batch size of 128, scaling the initial learning rate by 0.1
at epochs 150 and 250. On CIFAR100, we use SGD with
momentum, setting an initial learning rate of 0.05, weight
decay of 0.001, and momentum of 0.9. We run our model
for 200 epochs using a batch size of 128, scaling the initial
learning rate by 0.2 at epochs 60, 120, and 160.
CIFAR10 Results: Our original CIFAR10 model achieves
a top-1 accuracy of 94.77%. However, we ran into difficulty
training models from scratch on our resized images despite
trying multiple hyperparameter settings1 with both SGD and
Adam optimizers, we were unable to get a trained model above
65% accuracy without finetuning from the weights trained on
the 32× 32 images. We suspect by training using the 32× 32
image weights, our classifiers for the reshaped images may
have underfit the new reshaped images, with most weights
remaining similar to the original weights trained on 32 × 32
images. As Goodfellow et al. [10] notes, such underfitting
generally results in a model more vulnerable to adversarial
attack. However, despite the increased adversarial vulnerability
of our models trained on reshaped inputs, we still see similar
trends to CIFAR100. Thus, due to space contraints, we only
1We tried training with both our original CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 hyperpa-
rameters, training with initial learning rates ∈ {0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001} with
scaling factors ∈ {0.1, 0.2}, and also a learning rate scheduler to reduce the
learning rate every five consecutive epochs with no improvement. However,
none of these approaches were able to successfully converge.
show our results on CIFAR100 and provide all of our graphs,
including our CIFAR10 results, on our GitHub [26].
CIFAR100 Results: The results of the adversarial attacks
and defense methods are shown in Fig. 5. Our original CI-
FAR100 model achieves a top-1 accuracy of 74.57%. In con-
trast to MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we discover that when no
defense is applied, the original input size of 32× 32 performs
best across all attacks and  values. We conjecture that the
low classification accuracy on CIFAR100 for 16× 16 images
stems from the nature of the classification task. CIFAR100
is a significantly harder classification task than CIFAR10 as
the images are split into more classes (100 vs 10 classes).
Additionally, CIFAR100 classes are fairly similar to each other
the dataset defines groups of five classes into “superclasses”
(e.g. the beaver, dolphin, otter, seal, and whale classes belong
to the “aquatic mammals” superclass). As CIFAR100 only has
500 small (32× 32) images per class, a well-trained classifier
on CIFAR100 must classify a low-quality image into one of
100 fairly similar classes with very little training data. By
downsampling CIFAR100 images to 16 × 16 and squeezing
potentially useful features, we only make it more difficult for
our network to learn a good underlying representation of the
data and thus increase the model’s susceptibility to adversarial
examples.
Additionally, the upsampled CIFAR100 images become
more vulnerable to adversarial attacks as the increased input
size allows the attack method to search a larger space of
possible perturbations. 32 × 32 images thus lie in a “sweet
Fig. 5. Input size results on CIFAR100. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given attack
(FGSM, BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
spot” where the images are large enough for the classifier to
learn a good underlying representation of the data, but not
large enough to boost the performance of adversarial attack
methods. Thus, in scenarios where no defense is applied,
using the smallest imput image size that still allows the
model to learn well may increase a model’s robustness to
adversarial attack. This is consistent with our observation in
MNIST/Fashion-MNIST.
When the TVM defense is applied, we also see that 32×32
images are more robust in almost every case. 32× 32 images
perform 14% better than 16×16 images and 2-5% better than
64×64 images for small . For large , 32×32 images perform
5% better than their resized counterparts. Again, this suggests
that 32 × 32 images thus lie in a “sweet spot” that allows
for accurate classification without compromising adversarial
robustness.
When the JPEG defense is applied, we see that CI-
FAR100 is consistent with our previous experiments. As with
MNIST/Fashion-MNIST, the input image size on CIFAR100
correlates positively with adversarial robustness for small 
but defense performance drops faster for larger input sizes
as  increases. In the JPEG-defense-against-BIM case, we
again see that the smallest image size is the most robust for
 = 16/255. We also notice that the smallest input size has
the slowest drop in accuracy as  increases. This suggests that
the limitation on the classification accuracy of 16×16 images
may be due to model learning a poor representation rather than
larger values of  increasing attack strength.
Across both TVM and JPEG, we notice the same exception
with our results against the DeepFool attack, i.e., the defense
performance against the attack remains virtually the same
regardless of , as shown in the last column of Fig. 5.
3) Experiments on ImageNet:
Settings: We resize ImageNet input images to {56 ×
56, 112 × 112, 224 × 224}. We use a standard ResNet-18
architecture with an adaptive average pooling layer before the
fully connected layer, trained with the SGD optimizer with
an initial learning rate of 0.1, weight decay of 1e−4, and
momentum of 0.9. We run our model for 90 epochs using
a batch size of 256, scaling the initial learning rate by 0.1 at
epochs 30 and 60.
Results: The results of the adversarial attacks and defense
methods are shown in Fig. 6. Our original ImageNet model
achieves a top-1 accuracy of 70.12%. As all adversarial attacks
perform very well on ImageNet when no defense is applied,
with accuracy ranging from 0 to 3.1%, we do not try to
extrapolate any trends from such results. As our attacks are
based off of first-order optimization, any accuracy differences
across different input sizes could result from the stochastic
nature of each attack method.
However, we notice consistent trends across input sizes once
we apply the TVM and JPEG defenses. Again, as with the
previously tested datasets, input size correlates positively with
adversarial robustness for small  but defense performance
drops steeply for larger input sizes at larger . For the TVM
defense, we see the defense performance on 224 × 224 drop
Fig. 6. Input size results on ImageNet. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given attack
(FGSM, BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
steeper than for other input sizes, though TVM for 224× 224
images still claims the highest defended accuracy across all
 values. For the JPEG defense, we see the tradeoff between
increased ease of attack and increase ease of defense fully
swing the opposite way as 224 × 224 images perform very
poorly for values of  ∈ { 8255 , 16255}. The difference in trends
between the TVM and JPEG defenses suggests that the TVM
defense benefits much more from a larger input size than the
JPEG defense.
Across both TVM and JPEG, we again notice the same
exception with our results against the DeepFool attack, i.e.,
the defense performance against the attack remains virtually
the same regardless of , as shown in the last column of Fig. 6.
Both defenses are very effective, in particular on larger image
sizes.
B. Image Contrast Experiments
We next study the effect of image contrast on the perfor-
mance of adversarial attack and defense methods. For each
dataset we pick three different contrast levels: half the original
contrast value, the original contrast value, and double the
original contrast value. We retrain a new network for each
dataset and contrast setting using the settings specified in our
input size experiments.
1) Experiments on MNIST/Fashion-MNIST: The results of
the adversarial attacks and defense methods are shown in
Fig. 7. We only display MNIST results to save space, since F-
MNIST and MNIST results are very similar, and the complete
graphs are posted on our GitHub [26]. Our three trained
models, each trained on a different contrast setting, reach
roughly the same original classification accuracy. Our 0.5×
contrast model reaches 97.97% accuracy, our original contrast
model reaches 98.34% accuracy, and our 2× contrast model
reaches 98.44% accuracy. As Fig. 7 shows, higher contrast
images appear to be more adversarially robust in all three cases
(no defense, TVM, and JPEG) and across attack methods. The
accuracy on the reduced contrast setting consistently trails the
accuracies on the other contrast settings by around 7-8% for
 = 2255 when no defense is applied. The accuracy gap between
the normal contrast setting and the increased contrast setting
is smaller but still noticeable: around 2-4%.
By increasing the image contrast, we make recognizing
defining features easier for the network: edges and other fea-
tures important for correct image classification become more
visible. We believe this increased ease of classification may
make it more difficult for adversarial attacks to successfully
cause the attacked network to misclassify. However, we notice
that for larger  settings, the accuracy of the classifier on
modified contrast images degrades much more steeply than
for the original images. The gap between the lower contrast
setting and the other settings for the FGSM attack with
 = 16255 increases to 33%, a massive performance gap. In
several cases when  = 2255 (such as when defenses are
applied against FGSM), the accuracy for the 2× contrast
images falls beneath the accuracy of original contrast im-
ages. As with input image size, we believe that finding an
appropriate tradeoff is important although images with very
Fig. 7. Contrast results on MNIST. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given attack (FGSM,
BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
little contrast are difficult to classify, increasing image contrast
too much can also destroy features that a DNN relies upon
for classification. Images with too much contrast may skew
the training data, making it more difficult for a DNN to
learn a distribution that fits the underlying data. This only
increases the adversarial vulnerability of the DNN. Although a
model’s weak representation may result in higher clean image
classification and remains resilient to adversarial examples
when  is small, the model’s weaknesses become apparent
once the value of  increases for larger  values across
attack methods, performance degrades significantly faster for
the modified contrast images. Our experiment demonstrates the
importance of finding an appropriate contrast setting for input
images as a data preprocessing step a good contrast setting
can boost the performance of defense methods significantly
in some cases, boosting the performance of the JPEG defense
against BIM by more than 50% in the best case scenario.
2) Experiments on CIFAR10/CIFAR100: The results of the
adversarial attacks and defenses are shown in Fig. 8. We
only display CIFAR10 results to save space, since CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 results are very similar, and the complete
graphs are posted on our GitHub [26]. Again our three models
reach roughly the same original classification accuracy. On
CIFAR10, our 0.5× contrast model reaches 94.18% accuracy,
our original contrast model reaches 94.77% accuracy, and our
2× contrast model reaches 93.10% accuracy. On CIFAR100,
our 0.5× contrast model reaches 75.13% accuracy, our original
contrast model reaches 74.57% accuracy, and our 2× contrast
model reaches 72.15% accuracy. As with MNIST/Fashion-
MNIST, CIFAR10/CIFAR100 also demonstrates that adver-
sarial robustness mostly increases with higher contrast images.
However, we again note that in several cases when  = 16255 , the
2× contrast images perform worse than the original images.
This again suggests that although increasing image contrast
boosts adversarial robustness, too high of an image contrast
setting may harm the classifier’s ability to generalize, making
it susceptible to adversarial examples. Finally, defended ac-
curacy on DeepFool again appears consistent across  values,
suggesting that the tested compression defenses perform very
well.
3) Experiments on ImageNet: The results on ImageNet are
shown in Fig. 9. Again our three models reach roughly the
same original classification accuracy. Our 0.5× contrast model
reaches 69.54% accuracy, our original contrast model reaches
70.12% accuracy, and our 2× contrast model reaches 67.98%
accuracy. Given the effective performance of our attacks on
ImageNet when no defense is applied, reducing the accuracy to
below 5% in all cases, we choose not to draw any conclusions,
as the stochastic nature of training and adversarial example
generation could account for any trends we may try to draw.
Looking at the performance of the TVM defense, we see that
ImageNet very clearly follows the trend of larger contrast
settings achieving higher accuracy on adversarial examples
across all attacks and  settings. Intriguingly, we notice that
on BIM and PGD, the more advanced cost-function-based
attacks, the JPEG defense actually performs the worst for
Fig. 8. Contrast results on CIFAR10. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given attack
(FGSM, BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
the original contrast setting. The defended accuracy against
DeepFool again is consistent across  values, suggesting that
the tested compression defenses perform very well.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
In this paper, we investigate intrinsic dataset properties
on adversarial machine learning. In particular, we focus on
two intrinsic image dataset properties, namely image size and
image contrast, and test our hypothesis using four different
attacks and two different defense techniques on five popular
image classification datasets with different maximum allow-
able perturbations. We have found a number of interesting
observations.
• Image size and image contrast play important roles in the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks and defenses.
• In general, smaller image sizes are more robust to ad-
versarial attacks, but when the compression defense tech-
niques TVM and JPEG are applied, larger image sizes can
counter such attacks more effectively. However, for some
attack-defense-dataset combinations (e.g., BIM-JPEG for
Fashion-MNIST and ImageNet with large  settings), the
smallest image sizes are also more robust with defense.
This could have very interesting applications to future
edge applications of AI where small image sizes are
strongly preferred due to computing and communication
constraints. Our study shows that smaller images can
actually improve the adversarial robustness of DNNs.
• In terms of image contrast, higher image contrast usually
leads to better adversarial robustness, with or without
defenses. There are also some exceptions where too large
of a contrast setting may backfire (e.g., PGD-JPEG for
CIFAR10 with  = 16/255). More detailed studies are
needed to pinpoint the reasons behind this decrease in
robustness and find the best image contrast for adversarial
robustness when new datasets are designed.
• DeepFool, although an effective attack technique, can
be easily defended, across different image sizes and
contrasts, for all five datasets and four  settings.
Since this work, to our best knowledge, is the first sys-
tematic effort toward understanding the impacts of intrinsic
dataset properties on adversarial machine learning, there are
many open research problems and applications to explore.
More dataset properties such as the presence of outliers and
class imbalance can be studied. Additionally, jointly exploring
dataset properties and ML task complexity may better explain
why intrinsic dataset properties sometimes display different
trends on different datasets. Even for the input image size and
contrast problems that we study in this work, there are still
unanswered questions, e.g., given an original dataset, how to
augment or modify it such that the dataset will achieve the
best adversarial robustness, with or without defenses. Such
dataset preprocessing requires little computational overhead.
Dataset preprocessing is inherently model agnostic, making it
a cheap yet effective addition to any machine learning pipeline.
However, as we show preprocessing techniques are sometimes
Fig. 9. Contrast results on ImageNet. Each row represents a given defense (no defense, TVM, and JPEG) while each column represents a given attack
(FGSM, BIM, PGD, DeepFool). Four different  values are used in every attack-defense combination: 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, and 16/255.
attack/defense dependent, the optimal data preprocessing may
depend on the deployment scenario. Well-designed datasets
and preprocessing techniques in conjunction with existing
defense methods can create more robust machine learning
pipelines.
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